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CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS (CPSs) 
are smart systems including engi-
neered interacting networks of physi-
cal and computational components.1 
Modern CPSs comprise systems of 
systems with heterogeneous compo-
nents. These systems’ manufacturers 
must address dynamic and uncertain 
environmental constraints. CPSs are 
often safety-critical; any system mal-
function might seriously harm its 
users. The involved communicating 
peripherals also necessitate consider-
ation of security issues so that cyber-
security threats don’t affect a CPS’s 
proper functioning.
As the number of features re-
quested from existing systems grows, 
computation, communication, and 
control increasingly converge.2 This 
evolution comes with challenges that 
must be met for these systems to pro-
vide the needed services with the de-
sired quality attributes. CPSs span 
many domains and hence have a 
wide impact. These domains include 
biomedical and healthcare systems,3 
transportation systems,4 the smart 
grid,5 automotive systems,6 and man-
ufacturing systems.7
The Interplay between 
Safety and Security
We consider a CPS with valuable ser-
vices to be security-critical if it com-
municates with the outside world, 
because the communication channel 
might be opening up an attack vector 
against the CPS. On the other hand, 
a CPS is considered safety-critical if 
it can harm its environment—for ex-
ample, a malfunctioning pacemaker 
might harm its patient.
Figure 1 shows how safety and 
security overlap and affect each 
other. A CPS can be safety-critical, 
security-critical, or both. However, 
security is especially a high prior-
ity in safety-critical systems because 
vulnerabilities might lead to safety-
critical incidents.
Contemporary systems and soft-
ware engineering methods and ap-
proaches often prove inadequate for 
the high-confidence design and man-
ufacturing of CPSs. The conventional 
approach for engineering safety- and 
security-critical systems is to ad-
dress safety and security in sepa-
rate subsystems. However, owing 
to trends in CPSs toward openness, 
increased communication, and mul-
ticore architectures, this separation 
approach is no longer feasible. We 
need methods that deal simultane-
ously with functional safety and 
cybersecurity.
So, how do we model and analyze 
this interplay? For example, how 
do we ensure that software features 
on the same module don’t interfere 
with each other? How do we guaran-
tee that, if a security breach occurs, 
other system functions aren’t at risk? 
How do we develop guidelines that 
provide concrete technical advice 
for designing and deploying safe, 
secure systems instead of focusing 
on safety- and security-critical fea-
tures in isolation? How do we avoid 
negatively impacting assurance and 
compliance in safety-critical systems 
when we address cybersecurity chal-
lenges associated with them?
Dealing with Complexity
CPSs usually comprise various het-
erogeneous systems—for example, 
mechanical, electrical, electronics, 
and software systems. It’s not un-
common for CPSs to be networked 
Environment
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FIGURE 1. Cyber-physical systems influence each other’s and their environments’ safety and security.
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and interconnected; this connectiv-
ity introduces additional software 
and hardware for communication 
and control. So, CPSs’ heterogeneity 
makes them extremely complex.
It’s well known from systems en-
gineering that as a system’s com-
plexity increases, guaranteeing the 
quality of service expected from 
the system becomes more difficult. 
The uncertainty in CPSs—and hence 
their complexity—is exacerbated 
as they incorporate additional capa-
bilities throughout their lifecycle. As 
a CPS gains capabilities, its inher-
ent entropy increases, making it a 
challenge to provide any assurance. 
Interesting research opportunities 
exist for assuring the desired level of 
quality attributes as CPS complexity 
increases.
Potential Threats
Manufacturing used to be a 
single-shop-floor endeavor. Once 
manufacturing entered the distri-
bution era, cybermanufacturing8 
became the next phase of evolution. 
Beyond the traditional manufactur-
ing challenges, in cybermanufac-
turing risks have arisen through 
the addition of software and 
connectivity. Attack vectors that 
didn’t previously exist have quickly 
become a priority. Manufacturers 
now must ensure that a design sent 
to a networked 3D printing device 
can’t be extracted from network 
packets, a challenge they didn’t 
have to consider until recently.
Traditionally, software safety has 
focused on safety-critical systems 
such as those in aviation,9 medical 
devices,10 transportation,11 and nu-
clear power plants.12 Development 
processes as well as risk assessment 
and mitigation activities often cover 
the safety aspects of software in 
safety-critical systems. As the con-
nectivity of safety-critical systems or 
systems with a safety-critical core in-
creases, new attack vectors for these 
systems surface.
Introducing additional features 
into systems with a safety-critical 
core expands their attack surface. 
The ease of attack vector genera-
tion requires careful consideration in 
changing a system’s operating envi-
ronment as well. For legacy systems, 
incorporating security needs within 
the original requirements might not 
be possible.13
Once a system with a safety- 
critical core is in service, the sys-
tem’s evolution begins; it con-
tinues as additional services or 
capabilities are implemented.14 
For example, once an automo-
bile with a CAN (Controller Area 
Network) bus was built, one of 
the next services to be added was 
a tire-pressure-monitoring system 
(TPMS). When first deployed, the 
TPMS wasn’t considered safety-crit-
ical and thus wasn’t scrutinized as 
a critical system. If it had been, the 
widely reported exploitation of the 
TPMS15 might not have been so easy 
or might not have happened at all.
Similarly, a particular fleet man-
agement system provided location 
information for its vehicles via the 
cell phone network.16 The fleet man-
agement units were connected to the 
CAN bus of the trucks on which 
they were installed. At the time, the 
units had no protection for remote 
access. Once located, they were ac-
cessible over the Internet. It’s not 
difficult to imagine an attack by 
malware, similar to Mirai, target-
ing an unprotected fleet management 
system and possibly other CPSs.
Some specialized CPSs rely on 
lack of access to specialized equip-
ment and on laws for their pro-
tection. For example, the traffic 
collision avoidance system (TCAS), 
which aims to reduce the risk of 
mid-air collisions, has been used for 
decades. Despite incremental ver-
sions of the system, two fundamen-
tal assumptions remain:
• The equipment for operation is 
available only on aircraft.
• Illegal broadcasting in the TCAS 
frequency band won’t occur.
It wouldn’t be too difficult for an ad-
versary to attack such systems.
Risk Management
Given CPSs’ inherent complexity 
and their impact, risk assessment 
and reduction techniques are needed. 
These techniques must be easy to 
modify and adapt to accommo-
date changes in CPSs and their op-
erating environment. Additionally, 
some CPSs might require systematic 
risk assessment and management to 
As a system’s complexity increases, 
guaranteeing the system’s expected 
quality of service becomes more 
difficult.
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maintain a certificate of operation. 
In such cases, the tools and instru-
ments developed for risk manage-
ment must be rapid, cost-effective, 
and practical.
Some CPSs might not have any 
safety implications and thus might 
need only rudimentary risk assess-
ment. Researchers will have to de-
velop adaptable techniques that 
produce reliable results when, for 
example, two massive CPSs are in-
terconnected to create a new system.
Formal Methods and 
Legacy Systems
Because some CPSs will need a de-
gree of assurance about the correct-
ness of certain functions, we need 
innovative approaches to applying 
formal methods in such complex sys-
tems. Given that CPSs might contain 
complex legacy systems that aren’t 
well-documented, adopting formal 
methods to provide a degree of as-
surance for such systems becomes 
even more challenging. Tools and 
techniques for the use of formal 
methods in CPSs must meet the do-
main’s assurance and compliance 
needs while scaling up to deal with 
very large and complex systems.
Legacy systems constitute most of 
our infrastructures. These systems 
were built to provide well-defined 
services. They still provide those ser-
vices, but the environments in which 
they operate have changed consider-
ably. This necessitates revisiting them 
to upgrade and protect them accord-
ingly. Making changes to large, com-
plex systems is costly, and the rapid 
pace of change in IT systems makes 
things even more challenging.
New Approaches 
Needed
Considering that we depend on CPSs 
for our societal well-being, we need 
innovative approaches for designing, 
maintaining, updating, and upgrad-
ing them. These approaches must be 
cost-effective and system-agnostic. 
So, a technique developed for CPSs 
in one application domain should 
be adaptable for CPSs in another 
domain without major adaptation 
costs.
These approaches must also ad-
dress the challenges of combining 
services from multiple existing CPSs, 
including legacy systems. For exam-
ple, interconnecting diverse systems 
might require accurate translation 
between different data types for as-
sured operation of CPSs. Consider-
ing the various unfortunate events 
caused by faults associated with data 
types, such “minor” details in large-
scale systems such as CPSs introduce 
additional challenges.
Opportunities Ahead
The CPS research area seems to of-
fer various opportunities at different 
phases of the system lifecycle:
• Design and implementation. 
A CPS could be designed and 
implemented from scratch or 
around an existing system.
• Combining existing CPSs. Two 
or more existing CPSs could 
be merged into a new one for a 
specific purpose—for example, 
to make process control more 
efficient.
• Adding capabilities to existing 
CPSs. An existing CPS could in-
corporate additional sensor val-
ues to report, for finer-grained 
control.
• Dismantling or decommission-
ing existing CPSs. A CPS could 
be dismantled into its subsys-
tems, and subsystems or func-
tions that are no longer needed 
could be eliminated.
Each of these phases has unique chal-
lenges requiring researchers’ attention.
Given CPSs’ challenges and 
opportunities—especially regarding 
functional safety, cybersecurity, and 
their interplay, as well as the systems’ 
impact on society—new methods 
and techniques are needed for CPS 
development and assurance. The ar-
ticles in this theme issue aim to help 
address some of these challenges.
In This Issue
For this issue, we received 17 submis-
sions from around the world. After 
thorough and stringent reviews, we 
selected three articles that represent 
key issues associated with functional 
safety and cybersecurity in CPSs.
In “Safe, Secure Executions at 
the Network Edge: Coordinating 
Cloud, Edge, and Fog Computing,” 
Niko Mäkitalo and his colleagues 
introduce action-oriented pro-
gramming (AcOP). This program-
ming model has a framework that 
can dynamically adapt to edge and 
cloud computing according to the 
given environment and connectivity. 
Mäkitalo and his colleagues com-
pare AcOP to mobile-app-based and 
cloud-based deployment of CPSs. 
They also propose a framework to 
enable secure coalition and dynamic 
management of collective execu-
tions. This research’s strongest as-
pect is a proposed communication 
paradigm that addresses critical real-
life situations, such as car accidents.
In “Probabilistic Threat De-
tection for Risk Management in 
Cyber-physical Medical Systems,” 
Aakarsh Rao and his colleagues 
present a dynamic risk manage-
ment and mitigation approach based 
on probabilistic threat estimation. 
This research’s strongest aspect is 
the application of the results to 
solve critical issues regarding a 
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smart-connected-pacemaker, a can-
didate system from a demanding 
area of healthcare.
In “Leveraging Software-Defined 
Networking for Incident Response in 
Industrial Control Systems,” Andrés 
Murillo Piedrahita and his col-
leagues focus on how to respond 
to attacks targeting industrial con-
trol systems (ICSs). They show how 
software-defined networks and net-
work function virtualization tech-
nologies can help designers architect 
automatic-incident-response mecha-
nisms for ICSs. Such an infrastruc-
ture enables the implementation of a 
variety of automatic reactions.
B ecause CPSs are critical to sustaining and improving the quality of our lives, their 
safety and security are crucial. Thus, 
the topic requires greater attention 
from the engineering community.
Beyond the need for advances in 
engineering, awareness of this con-
cern is growing among policymakers, 
as was evidenced in European Commis-
sion President Jean-Claude Juncker’s 
State of the Union Address on 
13 September 2017:
Cyber-attacks can be more danger-
ous to the stability of democracies 
and economies than guns and 
tanks. … Cyber-attacks know no 
borders and no one is immune. 
This is why, today, the Commission 
is proposing new tools, including a 
European Cybersecurity Agency,  
to help defend us against such  
attacks.17
We hope this special issue serves 
as a drop in the ocean of knowledge 
on improving CPSs and the services 
they offer, especially regarding func-
tional safety, cybersecurity, and their 
interplay. 
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